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1. Introduction
Hermann Bondi’s classic book ‘Cosmology’ was, for many of us, an inspiring
introduction to the science of the cosmos. In a chapter entitled ‘Microphysics and
Cosmology’, Bondi lists the famous dimensionless constants, and mentions the
well-known coincidence, first highlighted by Dirac, between the ratio of the elec-
trical and gravitational forces within a hydrogen atom and the ratio of the Hubble
radius to the size of an electron. He says: ‘These coincidences are very striking,
and few would deny their possible deep significance, but the precise nature of the
connexion they indicate is not understood and is very mysterious.’
I am not sure to what extent Fred Hoyle was influenced in this matter by Bondi,
but he certainly took this problem seriously too. He also, through his famous
realisation of the C12 resonance level’s significance, made a celebrated addition
to the list of cosmic coincidences. Moreover, in pondering their significance he
was led to conjecture that the so called ‘constants of nature’ might not be truly
universal. In ‘Galaxies, Nuclei and Quasars’ Hoyle writes that ‘one must at least
have a modicum of curiosity about the strange dimensionless numbers that appear
in physics.’ He goes on to outline two possible attitudes to them. One is that
‘the dimensionless numbers are all entirely necessary to the logical consistency
of physics’; the second possibility is that the numbers are not in the broadest sense
universal, but that ‘in other places their values would be different’ Hoyle favoured
this latter option because then ‘the curious placing of the levels in C12 and O16 need
no longer have the appearance of astonishing accidents. It could simply be that
since creatures like ourselves depend on a balance between carbon and oxygen,
we can exist only in the portions of the universe where these levels happen to be
correctly placed.’
With these texts as my motivation, I’d like to summarise briefly how the issue
looks today. I believe that Fred’s conjecture is now even more attractive, though
the ‘portions of the universe’ between which the variation occurs must now be
interpreted as themselves vastly larger than the domain our telescopes can actually
observe – perhaps even entire ‘universes’ within a multiverse.
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But before dwelling further on these coincidences, it might be worth noting
that the ‘coincidence’ that Dirac and Bondi discussed does not in itself now cause
puzzlement. There is really just one very large number in physics: it is e2/Gm2p
(or, equivalently, the reciprocal of the ‘gravitational fine structure constant’ α−1G =(
h¯c
Gm2p
)
which is larger by 137. The Chandrasekhar mass exceeds the proton mass
by α−3/2G . Stars are so large because gravity is so weak: Dicke (1961) also realised
that they are also long-lived for the same reason. To present Dicke’s estimate for
stellar lifetimes in a slightly different way, we can define a characteristic time (cf
Salpeter 1964) equal to
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This is the time it would take a body to radiate its rest mass energy if had
the ‘Eddington luminosity’ where where radiation pressure balances gravity, and
if electron scattering provided the main opacity. The lifetime of an actual star is
obtained by multiplying ts by by various factors: the efficiency of nuclear energy (∼
0.007); the ratio of total pressure to radiation pressures (> 1); and the ratio of actual
opacity to electron-scattering opacity (> 1). However, the key point (evident from
the second way I have written the expression for ts above ) is that stellar lifetimes
are longer than the light travel time across the electron by the factor in square
brackets which involves Dirac’s large number. If we are observing the universe
when its age is of order the age of a star (and there is such a time in a big bang
model) then Dirac’s ‘coincidence’ would naturally be satisfied.
2. Do the ‘Special’ Values of the Constants Need an Explanation?
If we ever established contact with intelligent aliens, how could we bridge the
‘culture gap’? One common culture (in addition to mathematics) would be phys-
ics and astronomy. We and the aliens would all be made of atoms, and we’d all
trace our origins back to the ‘big bang’ 13.7 billion years ago. We’d all share
the potentialities of a (perhaps infinite) future. But our existence (and that of the
aliens, if there are any) depends on our universe being rather special. Any universe
hospitable to life – what we might call a biophilic universe – has to be ‘adjusted’
in a particular way. The prerequisites for any life of the kind we know about —
long-lived stable stars, stable atoms such as carbon, oxygen and silicon, able to
combine into complex molecules, etc — are sensitive to the physical laws and to
the size, expansion rate and contents of the universe. Indeed, even for the most
openminded science fiction writer, ‘life’ or ‘intelligence’ requires the emergence
of some generic complex structures: it can’t exist in a homogeneous universe, not
in a universe containing only a few dozen particles. Many recipes would lead to
stillborn universes with no atoms, no chemistry, and no planets; or to universes too
short-lived or too empty to allow anything to evolve beyond sterile uniformity.
Consider, for example, the role of gravity. Stars and planets depend crucially
on this force; however, we could not exist if gravity were much stronger than it
actually is. A large, long-lived and stable universe depends quite essentially on
α−1G being exceedingly large. Gravity also amplifies ‘linear’ density contrasts in
an expanding universe; it then provides a negative specific heat so that dissipative
bound systems heat up further as they radiate. There’s no thermodynamic paradox
in evolving from an almost structureless fireball to the present cosmos, with huge
temperature differences between the 3 degrees of the night sky, and the blazing
surfaces of stars. So gravity is crucial, but the weaker it is, the grander and more
prolonged are its consequences.
Newton’s constant G need not be fine-tuned – merely exceedingly weak so that
α−1G is indeed very large. However, the natural world is much more sensitive to
the balance between other basic forces. If nuclear forces were slightly stronger
than they actually are relative to electric forces two protons could stick together
so readily that ordinary hydrogen would not exist, and stars would evolve quite
differently. Some of the details are still more sensitive, as Hoyle emphasised.
Even a universe as large as ours could be very boring: it could contain just black
holes, or inert dark matter, and no atoms at all. Even if it had the same ingredients
as ours, it could be expanding so fast that no stars or galaxies had time to form; or it
could be so turbulent that all the material formed vast black holes rather than stars
or galaxies. – an inclement environment for life. And our universe is also special
in having three spatial dimensions. A four dimensional world would be unstable;
in two dimensions, nothing complex could exist.
The distinctive and special-seeming recipe characterising our universe seems to
me a fundamental mystery that should not be brushed aside merely as a brute fact.
Rather than re-addressing the classic ‘fine tuning’ examples, I shall focus on the
parameters of the big bang – the expansion rate, the curvature, the fluctuations,
and the material content. Some of these parameters (perhaps even all) may be
explicable in terms of a unified theory: or they may be somehow derivable from the
microphysical constants. But, irrespective of how that may turn out, it is interesting
to explore the extent to which the properties of a universe – envisaged here as the
aftermath of a single big bang – are sensitive to the cosmological parameters.
3. The Cosmological Numbers
Traditionally, cosmology was the quest for a few numbers. The first were H, and
q. Since 1965 we’ve had another : the baryon/photon ratio nb/nγ . This is believed
to result from a small favouritism for matter over antimatter in the early universe
– something that was addressed in the context of ‘grand unified theories’ in the
1970s. (Indeed, baryon non-conservation seems a prerequisite for any plausible in-
flationary model. Our entire observable universe, containing at least 1079 baryons,
could not have inflated from something microscopic if baryon number were strictly
conserved).
In the 1980s non-baryonic matter became almost a natural expectation, and
b/DM is another fundamental number.
We now have the revival of the cosmological constant lambda (or some kind of
‘dark energy’, with negative associated pressure, which is generically equivalent to
lambda).
Another specially important dimensionless number tells us how smooth the
universe is. It’s measured by
• The Sachs-Wolfe fluctuations in the microwave background
• the gravitational binding energy of clusters as a fraction of their rest mass
• or by the square of the typical length scale of mass- clustering as a fraction of
the Hubble radius.
It’s of course oversimplified to represent this by a single number, but insofar as one
can, its value (let’s call it Q) is pinned down to be 10−5. (Detailed modelling of the
fluctuations introduces further numbers: the ratio of scalar and tensor amplitudes,
and quantities such as the ‘tilt’, which measure the deviation from a pure scale-
independent Harrison-Zeldovich spectrum.)
4. Anthropic Requirements for a Universe
We can make a list of what would be required for a big bang to yield an ‘anthropic-
ally allowed’ universe – a universe where complexity, whether humanoid or more
like a black cloud, could unfold. The list would include the following:
• Some inhomogeneities (i.e. a non-zero Q): clearly there is no potential for
complexity if everything remains in a uniform ultra-dilute medium
• Some baryons: complexity would be precluded in a universe solely made of
dark matter, with only gravitational interactions.
• At least one star (probably, though perhaps superfluous for black-cloud-style
complexity)
• Some second-generation stars: only later-generation stars would be able to
have orbiting planets, unless heavy elements were primordial.
It is interesting to engage in ‘counterfactual history’ and ask what constraints
these various requirements would impose on hypothetical universes with different
characteristics – in particular, with different values of:
• The fluctuation amplitude Q (which is 10−5 in our actual universe)
• The cosmological constant
• The baryon/photon ratio (about 10−9 in our universe)
• The baryon/dark matter ratio b/DM(about 0.2 in our universe).
4.1. THE FLUCTUATION AMPLITUDE
First, we might explore what a universe would be like which was initially smoother
(Q smaller) or rougher (Q larger) than ours.
Were Q of order 10−6, there would be no clusters of galaxies; moreover, the
only galaxies would be small and anaemic. They would form much later than
galaxies did in our actual universe. Because they are loosely bound, processed
material would be expelled from shallow potential wells; there may therefore be no
second-generation stars, and so no planetary systems. If Q were even smaller than
10−6, there would be no star formation at all: very small structures of dark matter
would turn around late, and their constituent gas would be too dilute to undergo the
radiative cooling that is a prerequisite for star formation. (In a lambda-dominated
universe, isolated clumps could survive for an infinite time without merging into a
larger scale in the hierarchy. So eventually, for any Q > 10−8, a ‘star’ could form
– but by that time it might be the only bound object within the horizon).
Hypothetical astronomers in a universe with Q = 10−4 might find their cosmic
environment more varied and interesting than ours. Galaxies and clusters would
span a wider range of masses. The biggest clusters would be 30 times more massive
than any in our actual universe. There could be individual ‘galaxies’ – perhaps even
disc galaxies – with masses up to that of the Coma cluster and internal velocity
dispersions up to 2000 km/sec. These would have condensed when the universe was
only 3.108 years old, and when Compton cooling on the microwave background
was still effective
However a universe where Q were larger still – more than (say) 10−3 – would
be a violent and inhospitable place. Huge gravitationally-bound systems would
collapse, trapping their radiation and unable to fragment, soon after the epoch of
recombination. (Collapse at, say, 107 years would lead to sufficient partial ioniza-
tion (via strong shocks) to recouple the baryons and the primordial radiation.) Such
structures, containing the bulk of the material, would turn into vast black holes. It is
unlikely that galaxies of any kind would exist; nor is it obvious that much baryonic
material would ever go into stars: even if so, they would be in very compact highly
bound systems).
(Note that, irrespective of these anthropic constraints on its value, Q has to
be substantially less than one in order to make cosmology a tractable subject,
separate from astrophysics, This is because the ratio of the largest structures to
the Hubble radius is of order Q1/2. Numbers like  and H are only well-defined
insofar as the universe possesses ‘broad brush’ homogeneity – so that our observa-
tional horizon encompasses many independent patches each big enough to be a fair
sample. This wouldn’t be so, and the simple Friedmann models wouldn’t be useful
approximations, if Q weren’t much less than unity.)
According to most theories of the ultra-early universe, Q is imprinted by quantum
effects: microscopic fluctuations, after exponential expansion, give rise to the large-
scale irregularities observed in the microwave background sky, and which are the
‘seeds’ for galaxies and clusters. But as yet no theories pin down Q’s value.
Figure 1. The domains in the which bound structures can form, for different values of Q (from
Tegmark and Rees, 1998).
4.2.  OR DARK ENERGY
Theorists are even further from understanding . Indeed, the naive guess is that 
should be least 120 powers of 10 larger than it could be in our actual universe –
unless there were some cancellation mechanism. (Indeed, inflation models postu-
late an effective vacuum density that was indeed as high as this for a brief initial
interval.)
The interest has of course been hugely boosted recently, through the conver-
gence of several lines of evidence on a model where the universe is close to being
‘flat’, but with 4 percent in baryons, about 25 percent in dark matter, and the
remaining (dominant) component in  or some time-dependent ‘dark energy’.
(Incidentally, the full resurrection of  would be a great ‘coup’ for de Sitter. His
model, dating for the 1920s, not only describes inflation, but would then also de-
scribes future aeons of our cosmos with increasing accuracy. Only for the 50-odd
decades of logarithmic time between the end of inflation and the present would
it need modification!). For a universe with the actual observed values of Q, it is
readily shown that a value of  more than 5-10 times higher than the apparent ‘dark
energy’ density would have the ‘anti-anthropic’ consequence of precluding galaxy
formation. This happens because the cosmic repulsion would then be so fierce
that it would take over before any galaxies had a chance to form via gravitational
instability.
4.3. b AND DM : THE BARYON/DARK MATTER DENSITY
Baryons are anthropically essential; there are firm lower limits on their requis-
ite abundances, but they need not be the dominant constituent. (Indeed they are
far from dominant in our actual universe). Lower nb/nγ and lower DM reduce
the ‘efficient cooling’ domain in the Rees/Tegmark (1998) curves. reproduced in
Figure 1.
If the photons outnumbered the baryons and the dark matter particles by a still
larger factor than in our actual universe, then the universe would remain radiation-
dominated for so long that the gravitational growth of fluctuations would be inhib-
ited (Rees, 1980).
On the other hand, a higher value of nb/nγ (1 + DM/b) reduces teq and al-
lows gravitational clustering to start earlier. This reduces the minimum Q required
for emergence of non-linear structures (cf. Aguirre, 2001)
(Note also that the mechanism that gives rise to baryon favouritism may be
linked to the strong interactions, and therefore correlate with key numbers in nuc-
lear physics.)
4.4. DELINEATING THE ANTHROPICALLY-ALLOWED DOMAIN
In the above, I have envisaged changing just one parameter, leaving the others
with their actual values. But of course there may be correlations between them.
For example, suppose that there were big bangs with a whole range of Q-values.
Structures form earlier (when the matter density is higher) in universes with larger
Q, so obviously a higher Q is anthropically-compatible with a higher .
If we consider a two-dimensional situation where Q and  vary, then we find
that there is an anthropically allowed area. There are (rather vaguely defined) upper
and lower limits to Q (as already discussed) but within the range, there is an upper
limit to Q (see Figure 2).
We can carry out the exercise, in as many dimensions as we wish, of delineating
the anthropically-allowed domain in parameter space. (even though to quantify this
is more difficult). To delineate the allowed domains is procedurally uncontrover-
sial, but what about the motivation? It obviously depends on believing that the
laws of nature could have been otherwise – unless there is some scientific validity
in imagining ‘counterfactual universes’ this exercise seems vacuous.
5. Is it ‘Scientific’ to enquire about other Universes?
If our existence – or, indeed, the existence of any ‘interesting’ universe – depends
on a seemingly special cosmic recipe, how should we react? There seem two lines
to take: we can dismiss it as happenstance, or we can conjecture that our universe
is a specially favoured domain in a still vaster multiverse.
(a) Happenstance (or coincidence)
Figure 2. This shows in a two-dimensional parameter space  and Q. The upper and lower limits to
Q are discussed by Tegmark and Rees (1998). The upper limit to  stems from the requirement that
galactic-mass bound systems should form before the universe enters its accelerating de Sitter phase.
Our universe (obviously) lies in the anthropically-allowed domain. But we cannot say whether it is
at a typical location within that domain without a specific model for the probability distributions of
Q and  in the ensemble.
Maybe a fundamental set of equations, which some day will be written on
T-shirts, fixes all key properties of our universe uniquely. It would then be an
unassailable fact that these equations permitted the immensely complex evolution
that led to our emergence.
But I think there would still be something to wonder about. It’s not guaranteed
that simple equations permit complex consequences To take an analogy from math-
ematics, consider the Mandelbrot set. This pattern is encoded by a short algorithm,
but has infinitely deep structure: tiny parts of it reveal novel intricacies however
much they are magnified. In contrast, you can readily write down other algorithms,
superficially similar, that yield very dull patterns. Why should the fundamental
equations encode something with such potential complexity, rather than the boring
or sterile universe that many recipes would lead to?
One hard-headed response is that we couldn’t exist if the laws had boring con-
sequences. We manifestly are here, so there’s nothing to be surprised about. I think
we would need to know why the unique recipe for the physical world should permit
consequences as interesting as those we see around us ( and which, as a byproduct,
allowed us to exist)
(b) A special universe drawn from an ensemble, or multiverse
But there is another perspective – a highly speculative one, however. There
may be many ‘universes’ of which ours is just one. In the others, some laws and
physical constants would be different. But our universe wouldn’t be just a random
one. It would belong to the unusual subset that offered a habitat conducive to the
emergence of complexity and consciousness. If our universe is selected from a
multiverse, its seemingly designed or fine tuned features wouldn’t be surprising.
This might seem arcane stuff, disjoint from ‘traditional’ cosmology – or even from
serious science. But my prejudice is to be openminded about ensembles of universe
and suchlike, and even to suspect that we may not be able to account for some
features of our own universe without invoking them.
First, a semantic digression: the word ‘universe’ traditionally denotes ‘everything
there is’. Therefore if we are to consider other domains of space time (originating in
other big bangs) we should really define the whole ensemble as ‘the universe’, and
introduce a new word – ‘metagalaxy’ for instance – to denote what observational
cosmologists traditionally study. However, so long as this whole idea remains spec-
ulative, it is probably best to continue to denote what cosmologists observe as ‘the
universe’, and to introduce a new term, ‘multiverse’, for the whole hypothetical
ensemble.
Some might regard other universes — regions of space and time that we can-
not observe (perhaps even in principle and not just in practice) – as being in the
province of metaphysics rather than physics. Science is an experimental or ob-
servational enterprise, and it’s natural to be troubled by invocations of something
unobservable. But I think ‘other universes’ (in this sense) already lie within the
proper purview of science. It is not absurd or meaningless to ask ‘Do unobservable
universes exist?’, even though no quick answer is likely to be forthcoming. The
question plainly can’t be settled by direct observation, but relevant evidence can be
sought, which could lead to an answer.
There is actually a blurred transition between the readily observable and the
absolutely unobservable, with a very broad grey area in between (see Figure 3).
To illustrate this, one can envisage a succession of horizons, each taking us further
than the last from our direct experience:
(i) Limit of present-day telescopes
There is a limit to how far out into space our present-day instruments can probe.
Obviously there is nothing fundamental about this limit: it is constrained by cur-
rent technology. Many more galaxies will undoubtedly be revealed in the coming
decades by bigger telescopes now being planned. We would obviously not demote
such galaxies from the realm of proper scientific discourse simply because they
haven’t been seen yet.
(ii) Limit in principle at present era
Figure 3. Extending horizons beyond the directly-observable.
Even if there were absolutely no technical limits to the power of telescopes,
our observations are still bounded by the particle horizon, which demarcates the
spherical shell around us at which the redshift would be infinite.
If our universe were decelerating, then the horizon of our remote descendants
would encompass extra galaxies that are beyond our horizon today. It is, to be
sure, a practical impediment if we have to await a cosmic change taking billions
of years, rather than just a few decades (maybe) of technical advance, before a
prediction about a particular distant galaxy can be put to the test. But does that
introduce a difference of principle? Surely the longer waiting-time is a merely
quantitative difference, not one that changes the epistemological status of these
faraway galaxies?
(iii) Never-observable galaxies from ‘our’ Big Bang
But what about galaxies that we can never see, however long we wait? It’s now
believed that we inhabit an accelerating universe. As in a decelerating universe,
there would be galaxies so far away that no signals from them have yet reached
us; but if the cosmic expansion is accelerating, we are now receding from these
remote galaxies at an ever-increasing rate, so if their light hasn’t yet reached us, it
never will. Such galaxies aren’t merely unobservable in principle now – they will
be beyond our horizon forever. But if a galaxy is now unobservable, it hardly seems
to matter whether it remains unobservable for ever, or whether it would come into
view if we waited a trillion years. (And I have argued, under (ii) above, that the
latter category should certainly count as ‘real’.)
(iv) Galaxies in disjoint universes
The never-observable galaxies in (iii) would have emerged from the same Big
Bang as we did. But suppose that, instead of causally-disjoint regions emerging
from a single Big Bang (via an episode of inflation) we imagine separate Big
Bangs. Are space-times completely disjoint from ours any less real than regions
that never come within our horizon in what we’d traditionally call our own uni-
verse? Surely not – so these other universes too should count as real parts of our
cosmos, too
Whether other universes exist or not is a scientific question. Those who are
prejudiced against the concept should regard the above step-by-step argument as an
exercise in ‘aversion therapy’. From a reluctance to deny that galaxies with redshift
10 are proper objects of scientific enquiry, you are led towards taking seriously
quite separate space-times, perhaps governed by quite different ‘laws’.
Linde, Vilenkin and others have performed computer simulations depicting an
‘eternal’ inflationary phase where many universes sprout from separate big bangs
into disjoint regions of spacetimes – each such region itself vastly larger than our
observational horizon. Guth, Harrison and Smolin have, from different viewpoints,
suggested that a new universe could sprout inside a black hole, expanding into
a new domain of space and time inaccessible to us. And Randall and Sundrum
suggest that other universes could exist, separated from us in an extra spatial di-
mension; these disjoint universes may interact gravitationally, or they may have no
effect whatsoever on each other.
None of these scenarios has been simply dreamed up out of the air: each has a
serious, albeit speculative, theoretical motivation. However, one of them, at most,
can be correct. Quite possibly none is: there are alternative theories that would
lead just to one universe. Firming up any of these ideas will require a theory that
consistently describes the extreme physics of ultra-high densities, how structures
on extra dimensions are configured, etc. Perhaps, in the 21st-century theory, physi-
cists will develop a theory that yields insight into (for instance) why there are three
kinds of neutrinos, and the nature of the nuclear and electric forces. Such a theory
would thereby acquire credibility. If the same theory, applied to the very beginning
of our universe, were to predict many big bangs, then we would have as much
reason to believe in separate universes as we now have for believing inferences
from primordial nucleosynthesis about the first few minutes of cosmic history.
6. Universal Laws, or Mere Bylaws?
Some theorists, Frank Wilczek for instance, regard ‘are the laws of physics unique?’
as a key scientific challenge for the new century. The answer determines how much
variety the other universes – if they exist – might display. If there were something
uniquely self-consistent about the actual recipe for our universe, then the aftermath
of any big bang would be a re-run of our own universe. But a far more interest-
ing possibility (which is certainly tenable in our present state of ignorance of the
Figure 4. ‘Decision tree’. Progress in 21-st century physics should allow us to decide whether
anthropic explanations are irrelevant or, on the other hand, the best we can ever hope for.
underlying laws) is that the underlying laws governing the entire multiverse may
allow variety among the universes. Some of what we call ‘laws of nature’ may in
this grander perspective be local bylaws, consistent with some overarching theory
governing the ensemble, but not uniquely fixed by that theory. Many things in our
cosmic environment – for instance, the exact layout of the planets and asteroids
in our Solar System – are accidents of history. Likewise, the recipe for an entire
universe may be arbitrary.
More specifically, some aspects may be arbitrary and others not. As an analogy
(which I owe to Paul Davies) consider the form of snowflakes. Their ubiquitous
six-fold symmetry is a direct consequence of the properties and shape of water
molecules. But snowflakes display an immense variety of patterns because each
is moulded by its micro-environments: how each flake grows is sensitive to the
fortuitous temperature and humidity changes during its growth.
If physicists achieved a fundamental theory, it would tell us which aspects of
nature were direct consequences of the bedrock theory (just as the symmetrical
template of snowflakes is due to the basic structure of a water molecule) and which
are (like the distinctive pattern of a particular snowflake) the outcome of accidents.
The cosmological numbers in our universe, and perhaps some of the so-called
constants of laboratory physics as well, could be ‘environmental accidents’, rather
than uniquely fixed throughout the multiverse by some final theory. Some seem-
ingly ‘fine tuned’ features of our universe could then only be explained by ‘an-
thropic’ arguments [see Figure 4]. Although this style of explanation raises hackles
among some physicists it is analogous to what any observer or experimenter does
when they allow for selection effects in their measurements: if there are many
universes, most of which are not habitable, we should not be surprised to find
ourselves in one of the habitable ones!
The entire history of our universe could just be an episode of the infinite mul-
tiverse; what we call the laws of nature (or some of them) may be just parochial
bylaws in our cosmic patch. Such speculations dramatically enlarge our concept
of reality. Putting them on a firm footing must await a successful fundamental
theory that tells us whether there could have been many ‘big bangs’ rather than just
one, and (if so) how much variety they might display. Until this fundamental issue
is settled one way or the other, we won’t know whether anthropic arguments are
irrelevant or unavoidable.
7. Testing Multiverse Theories Here and Now
We may one day have a convincing theory that accounts for the very beginning
of our universe, tells us whether a multiverse exists, and (if so) whether some so
called laws of nature are just parochial by-laws in our cosmic patch. But while
we’re waiting for that theory – and it could be a long wait – we can check whether
anthropic selection offers a tenable explanation for the apparent fine tuning. Such
a hypothesis could even be refuted: this would happen if our universe turned out to
be even more specially tuned than our presence requires.
We could apply this style of reasoning to the important numbers of physics (for
instance, ) to test whether our universe is typical of the subset that that could
harbour complex life. Most physicists would consider the ‘natural’ value of  to
be large, because it is a consequence of a very complicated microstructure of space.
Perhaps there is only a rare subset of universes where  is below the threshold that
allows galaxies and stars to form.  in our universe obviously had to be below
that threshold, But if our universe were drawn from an ensemble in which  was
equally likely to take any value, we wouldn’t expect it to be too far below it.
Current evidence suggests that if  constituted the ‘dark energy’, its actual
value is 5-10 times below that threshold. That would put our universe between the
10th or 20th percentile of universes in which galaxies could form. In other words,
our universe isn’t significantly more special, with respect to , than our emergence
demanded. But suppose that (contrary to current indications) observations showed
that  made no discernible contribution to the expansion rate, and was thousands
of times below the threshold, not just 5–10 times. This ‘overkill precision’ would
raise doubts about the hypothesis that  was equally likely to have any value, and
suggest that it was zero for some fundamental reason (or that it had a discrete set
of possible values, and all the others were well about the threshold).
I’ve taken  just as an example. We could analyse other important numbers of
physics in the same way, to test whether our universe is typical of the habitable
subset that that could harbour complex life. The methodology requires us to decide
what values are compatible with our emergence. It also requires a specific theory
that gives the probability of any particular value.
With this information, one can then ask if our actual universe is ‘typical’ of the
subset in which we could have emerged. If it is an atypical member even of this sub-
set (not merely of the entire multiverse) then our hypothesis would be disproved.
Other parameters could be analysed similarly – testing in a multi-parameter space
whether our universe is a typical member within the anthropically allowed domain.
As a two-dimensional example, consider the joint constraints on  and Q in
Figure 2. We cannot decide whether our universe is typical without a theory that
tells us what ‘measure’ to put on each part of the 2-dimensional parameter space.
If high-Q universes were more probable, and the probability density of  were
uniform, then we should be surprised not to find ourselves in a universe with higher
 and higher Q.
These examples show that some claims about other universes may be refutable,
as any good hypothesis in science should be. We cannot confidently assert that there
were many big bangs – we just don’t know enough about the ultra-early phases of
our own universe. Nor do we know whether the underlying laws are ‘permissive’:
settling this issue is a challenge to 21st century physicists. But if they are, then so-
called anthropic explanations would become legitimate – indeed they’d be the only
type of explanation we’ll ever have for some important features of our universe.
Models with low omega, non-zero lambda two kinds of dark matter, and the
rest may seem ugly. Some theorists are upset by these developments, because it
frustrates their craving for maximal simplicity. I think we can learn a lesson from
cosmological debates in the 17th century. Galileo and Kepler were upset that plan-
ets moved in elliptical orbits, not in perfect circles. Newton later showed, however,
that all elliptical orbits could be understood by a single unified theory of gravity.
Likewise our universe may be just one of an ensemble of all possible universes,
constrained only by the requirement that it allows our emergence. But to regard
this outcome as ugly may be as myopic as Kepler’s infatuation with circles: Newton
was perhaps the greatest scientific intellect of the second millennium. Perhaps his
third-millennium counterpart will uncover a mathematical system that governs the
entire multiverse.
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